Individuals' output often depends not just on their ability and actions, but also on external factors or fundamentals, whose effect they cannot separately identify. At the same time, many individuals have incorrect beliefs about their own ability. Heidhues et al.
In this paper, we carry out the first experimental test of Heidhues et al. (2018) , who characterise overconfident and underconfident individuals equilibrium beliefs and learning process in these situations. They assume individuals do not update their belief about their own ability. This causes overconfident individuals' belief about the value of the fundamental to fall as they update, converging to a point significantly less than its true value. They make sub-optimal decisions because of their inaccurate beliefs, observe lower than expected output, and then conclude the fundamental is even worse than they expected. Learning is self-defeating -as overconfident individuals update, their belief about the fundamental gets less and less accurate. The student thinks their lower than expected marks are just because the professor is harsher than they actually are, so next time they put in less effort than they should, get even lower marks, conclude that the professor is even harsher than they thought and so on. Yet underconfident individuals' beliefs about the fundamental converge to a point near its true value, bounded by their belief about their ability.
Thus, the theory makes three predictions. Firstly, overconfident individuals' beliefs about the value of the fundamental should fall as they update -they think it is worse and worse. Secondly, underconfident individuals' beliefs about the fundamental should converge towards its true value as they update. It follows from these two predictions that overconfident individuals should have lower beliefs about the value of the fundamental than underconfident individuals after several rounds of updating -they should think it is worse than underconfident individuals do.
To test the theory, we get subjects to answer five sets of questions, marked by a 'computerised marker' that only marks a proportion of correct answers as correct. We infer their beliefs about the proportion of correct answers it marks as correct. Then, we use regression models with individual fixed effect to identify the causal effect of updating on these beliefs. The proportion of correct answers marked as correct is the value of the fundamental. Subjects do not know the true value. We pay subjects for each mark they get, and tell them how many marks they got, after each round. We identify each subject's belief about the proportion of correct answers marked as correct after each round through a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak game (Becker et al. 1964) where subjects bid to take an additional, correctly marked, test. Only the number of times subjects update changes over the experiment. Thus, we can identify the causal effect of updating on beliefs by regressing the number of times they have updated on subjects' belief about the proportion of correct answers marked as correct with individual fixed effects. We use this to test each of the predictions above. We test the first two by fitting fixed effect panel models to subjects belief, and its squared distance from the true value, in each round. We test the third by regressing a dummy variable for overconfidence on subjects beliefs after the first and final tests. We then fit a non-parametric Gaussian mixture model (see Lindsay (1995) ) to overconfident subjects' marks and beliefs in the first and final rounds to find heterogeneous effects. We are the first in the literature on overconfidence to use machine learning to find heterogeneous effects.
We find that overconfident subjects have a significantly lower beliefs about the value of the fundamental than underconfident subjects after both the first and final rounds. But we do not find a a significant causal effect of updating on overconfident subjects' beliefs or the squared distance of underconfident subjects' beliefs from the true value of the fundamental. Thus, they do not appear to be different because of how individuals learn. We do not find any heterogeneous effects either. This is inconsistent with Heidhues et al.'s theory.
Thus our results do suggest that overconfident individuals will act sub-optimally in these situations. Their beliefs about the fundamental are too low, so they will act sub-optimally. They think the marker is too harsh, so will put too little effort into work and so on. But we find no evidence that this is because of how they learn about the fundamental. This is key because, if correct, Heidhues et al.'s theory has important implications. Overconfidence is common and individuals cannot separately identify the effects of fundamentals from ability in a wide array of economically important situations, from CEOs making investment decisions (e.g see Malmendier & Tate (2005) Malmendier & Tate (2008) ), to managers delegating to their employees (see Heidhues et al. (2018) ), to partisan politicians choosing policies (e.g see Rollwage et al. (2018) ). 1 It suggests these individuals will often act sub-optimally because of how they learn, leading to large widespread welfare losses. Costly interventions to correct individuals expectations about their own ability could prevent this by changing how they learn, and thus be welfare-improving. We find no evidence that overconfident individuals have incorrect beliefs because of how they learn though. Thus, interventions acting through changing the learning process might not be effective.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 summarises Heidhues et al.'s theory. Section 2 explains our design. Section 3 presents our results. Section 4 concludes.
Predictions
Consider an individual, who produces observable output q t based on their action, e, their ability, a, and some fundamental φ. For example, imagine a student taking tests, who gets marks (q t ) based on the effort they put in (e), how good they are at their subject (a), and the proportion of their correct answers their professor marks as correct (φ). We can describe them as producing output using the output function:
where:
Q(e, a, φ) = φf (a, e) − c(e).
(2)
c(e) is the cost of choosing a given action (here putting in more effort -costly due to fatigue, and the leisure time they could take otherwise) which is convex; t is an i.i.d error term; output is increasing in the fundamental, the action, and ability, and the optimal action e * (φ) is increasing in the fundamental. 2 The student gets more marks the less harshly their professor marks their works, the more effort they put into it, and the better they are at their subject. This is a generalisation of the output function given by (Heidhues et al. (2018) pg.1165) 3 This task, and associated output function, is a key example in the paper where their theory should apply.
Consider a situation where the individual does not know the true values of φ and a, and they observe q t each time period. The student just observes their marks, not their own ability or the professor's harshness. Denote the individual's belief about their own ability asã -how good the student thinks they are. Assume the individual updates their belief about φ using Bayes' rule from heterogeneous priors, but critically does not updateã. Regardless of the marks they observe, the student does not change their belief about how good they are, but instead only changes their belief about how harsh a marker their professor is. Now, we can begin to characterise their learning process and equilibrium beliefs.
Definition 1 An individual's surprise function is:
where A is their actual ability, and Φ is the true value of the fundamental. Their surprise is the difference between the output they get and the output they expect to get given their beliefs about their ability and the professor's harshness. Using this, we can define our solution concept.
Definition 2
The Berk-Nash equilibrium of a game with misspecified models is the set e * (φ), a, φ such that Γ(φ) = 0 i.e Q(e * (φ), A, Φ) = Q(e * (φ),ã, φ).
2 Or technically, ∂Q(e,a,φ) ∂φ > 0, ∂Q(e,a,φ) ∂e > 0, ∂Q(e,a,φ) ∂a > 0, and ∂ 2 Q(e,a,φ) ∂e∂φ > 0. 3 More specifically, they say that we can describe them using the output function Q(e, a, φ) = (a + e)φ − c(e). This is too restrictive though -the following does not depend on the student's raw output being strictly linear in effort and ability as long as it satisfies the above condition. Thus, we use a more general form. Note this also applies for any Q(e, a, φ) that satisfies the assumptions below without loss of generality. This is the point where the individual's average output is what they expect it to be -the student gets what they think they should get. Note here that the individual's beliefs do not have to be correct for this to be a stable equilibrium. They just have to be consistent with the output they observe. As the output they believe they should get is the same as the output they actually observe (Γ(φ) = 0) they do not revise their belief about φ based on what they observe. Assume that for each Q(e,ã, φ) there is some φ such that Q(e,ã, φ ) = Q(e, A, Φ) -a Berk-Nash equilibrium that exists whatever the individual's belief about their own ability. Now, we can characterise how confidence affects how individuals learn, and their equilibrium φ. First, consider an individual who is overconfident.
Proposition 1 (Heidhues et al. (2018) ) Consider an individual withã > A, who sets e to myopically optimise q. Their belief φ converges to some φ ∞ such that φ ∞ < Φ. The point e * (φ ∞ ),ã, φ ∞ is a unique, stable, Berk-Nash equilibrium.
For ease, we just sketch the 'heuristic argument' that beliefs will converge here, not the technical proof (see Heidhues et al. (2018) pg. 1168 − 9, for the technical proofs that beliefs will converge, see pg. 1185 − 1211). In all the below, for both overconfident and underconfident individuals, we consider the case of a myopic individual without loss of generality -see Heidhues et al. for the case where they dynamically optimise.
Figure 1: Learning with Overconfident Beliefs When Action is Endogenous
Consider an overconfident individual in time period t = 0, represented in Figure 1 . For example, assume they are an overconfident student as above. To fix ideas, assume we can describe their payoff from their work using the specific output function:
Taking the derivative with respect to effort and setting it equal to zero, we can see that, for a given φ, the optimal action is:
Thus for easier reading, we put e, φ 2 on the horizontal axis. Call their prior belief about φ, φ 1 . Call the average output that the student thinks they can achieve given what they believe their ability and the fundamental is their 'perceived average achievable output line' Q(e * (φ),ã, φ) -the marks they think they should get given how good they think they are and how harsh they think their professor is. Call the average output the student can actually achieve given what their ability and the fundamental actually are the 'average output possibilities curve' Q(e * (Φ), A, Φ) -the actual mark the student gets given how good they actually are and how harsh their professor actually is. As they are myopically optimising their actions, at t = 1 the student sets e to optimise Q(e(φ 1 ),ã, φ 1 ). This would put them at point B1 in Figure 1 , with where they put in effort φ 1 2 and receive payoff q 1,e . Then they observe their payoff. As their actual ability is A <ã, they are actually on the 'average output possibility curve' Q(e * (φ),ã, φ). Instead of achieving the point B1 and observing q 1,e , they actually get to C1 and observe q 1,a . Their marks are lower than they expected. The individual then updates their beliefs using this new information. Yet they cannot change their belief aboutã, so they must infer that they are still on Q(e * (φ),ã, φ). Therefore, they take this lower than expected output as a signal that the fundamental is worse than they believed. As they cannot updateã they must be at the point where they would achieve q 1,a on Q(e * (φ),ã, φ). Thus they infer that φ = φ 2 . Their professor is obviously just a harsher marker than they thought they were! After updating their beliefs, the process repeats -they think they will achieve B2 but instead end up at C2, causing them to infer the professor is a harsher marker than they thought, and so on, until they end up at E. This is the stable equilibrium -at E their actual output function and the output function they believe they have intersect, so the output they expect and the output they actually observe are the same. The student always reduces their effort in the test until get the marks they expect to get given what they believe their ability is and how harsh they believe their professor is. Beliefs must converge to this equilibrium, as whenever the individual is at a point above E they must revise their beliefs down. Now we turn to the case of individuals who are underconfident. 4
Proposition 2 (Heidhues et al. (2018) ) Consider an individual withã ≤ A, who sets e to myopically optimise q. Their belief φ converges to some φ ∞ such that |φ ∞ − Φ| ≤ ∆, where ∆ = A −ã The point e * (φ ∞ ),ã, φ ∞ is a unique, stable, Berk-Nash equilibrium.
Again, the individual sets their action to myopically optimise q subject to their loss function, thinking they are on Q(e * ,ã, φ). The student puts the amount of effort into the test to optimise their output from their marks minus the cost of effort. Yet assume that they now initially observe a higher than expected output. This observation causes them to revise their beliefs about the fundamental upwards. If their belief about the fundamental is now too optimistic, they will observe lower than expected output and revise their belief about the fundamental downwards. If their belief about the fundamental is still too pessimistic, they will observe higher than expected output and revise their beliefs about the fundamental upwards. If they get lower than expected marks in the next test, they conclude that the professor must be harsher; if they get higher than expected marks, they conclude that the professor must be less harsh. This causes them to reduce or increase the e in the next time period. If the professor is harsher than expected, it is worth putting in less effort; if the professor is less harsh than expected, it is worth putting in more effort. This process continues until their belief converges to the limiting belief φ ∞ where Q(e,ã, φ ∞ ) = Q(e, A, Φ). This is the stable equilibriumtheir output function and the output function they believe they have intersect, so the output they expect and the output they actually observe are the same. They get the mark they expect to get. Instead of causing their belief about the fundamental to diverge from its true value, updating now causes their belief about the fundamental to converge to a point near its true value. Learning is self-correcting, not self-defeating, when individuals are underconfident.
Individuals learn in a misguided manner about φ in this model because they cannot updateã or separately identify the effect of φ from a. If they could update their belief aboutã, they could update the average output possibility curve they think they are on. If they could separately identify the effects of φ and a, they could identify discrepancies in their beliefs about φ and a. In both cases, the only stable equilibrium set of beliefs is φ = Φ, andã = a. At any other point, q will be different from what they expect given their beliefs about φ and a, so the individual will update their beliefs about one of them. The first assumption is key -the individual's degenerate belief about their own ability drives their learning behaviour in situations where they cannot separate the effect of φ and a on output. Heidhues et al. assume it for two reasons: because it generates a simple, tractable model, and because they think it is realistic (see Heidhues et al. (2018) The second and third directly fall out of the above. The first follows from the second and the third. Imagine overconfident and underconfident individuals draw their initial beliefs from the same distribution. Thus, before individuals start updating, E(φ Overconf ident ) = E(φ U nderconf ident ). Overconfident individuals' beliefs fall as they update, so they converge to φ ∞ < Φ. Underconfident individuals' beliefs converge to φ ∞ ≈ Φ. So the expectation of overconfident individuals' beliefs will be strictly lower than the expectation of underconfident individuals' beliefs.
We can use the structure of the output function to test these predictions. Take (2), and separate the left hand side into observed output, the marks the student gets, and the cost of getting those marks. Subtracting c(e) from both sides gives us:
-the output function in terms of the marks we observe ν. Students do not know their actual score f (a, e) or the true harshness of the marker, φ. So we can write their output possibility function, which describes the marks they think they can achieve, at some time t as:
where f (a, e) t is what they think their actual mark is at t, and φ t is how harsh they think the marker is at t. We can thus recover their beliefs about the harshness of the marker:
if we can infer the mark they think they should have gotten f (a, e) t . Thus, what matters for identification in this paper is that φ is multiplicative and c(e) is separable.
Design
The purpose of our experiment is to create an environment where subjects' output depended on ability, an action, and the fundamental, they could not separately identify the effect of their ability and the fundamental on output, they would update their beliefs about the value of the fundamental multiple times, and we can infer what these beliefs are. We experimentally induce the case of a student completing an assignment marked by their professor. This is a one of the main examples from Heidhues et al. (2018) . We thus test the central prediction of the theory, using a prominent example in their paper.
We get our subjects (students) to take a series of tests, marked by 'the computer' (the professor), which only marks a proportion of correct answers as correct. The number of answers a subject gets correct depends on their ability and the amount of effort they choose to put into the test (f (a, e)). We use a cognitive skills test, so marks do depend on effort. We mark a constant proportion of correct answers as correct (φ), which is multiplicative, and pay subjects for each mark they get correct. Putting in more effort into the test is costly (c(e)) and this cost is separable. Spending longer on each question costs subjects in time and opportunity cost, but cost is not affected by the value of the fundamental.
After each test, subjects bid for the chance to take another test at the end of the experiment. Subjects know every correct answer in this test will be marked as correct. Thus, their bid allows us to infer the marks they think they should have gotten. We know the number of marks we give each subject for each test. Therefore, we can recover their belief about the fundamental by dividing the number of marks they actually got by the number of marks indicated by their bid, as in (9). Figure 2 shows our experiment. We used a 'within-sample' design -we measured each subject taking multiple tests over time as opposed to using a treatment and control sample (e.g see Charness et al. (2011) ). Using the same subjects is better for testing how the subjects learn over time.
Subjects took five rounds of tests. In each round, subjects took a test of eight questions, 'marked by the computer'. 'The computer' marked 50% of correct answers as incorrect, and all incorrect answers as incorrect. Thus, the true value of the fundamental, Φ, is 0.5. Subjects do not know what this proportion is. It is the same in each round. After each test, subjects were given $0.05 for each answer marked as correct. For example, if a subject got six answers correct, we tell them they got three marks and award them $0.15. After each payment, subjects then bid for a chance to take another test where each correct answer would be marked as correct. Thus, if a subject got six answers correct in this test, they would get six marks. After the fifth round, we randomly select one of these bids and use it play a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak game (BDM hereafter). If they win, they then take the test.
Before starting the tests, subjects read a set of instructions. We told them they would take a series of tests which 'the computer' would mark, and would be paid for each answer 'the computer' marked as correct. We told them it would mark a fixed proportion of answers they got correct as incorrect, but not the proportion. Next, subjects read a second set of instructions telling them how the BDM game works. They were told that they would be asked to bid for the chance to take another test at the end of the experiment after they had taken each test, and that one of their bids would be randomly selected to see if they took the test. 6 We then tested their understanding of the optimal strategy in the game. Subjects had to reread the instructions and retake the test until they selected the correct bid.
In the first round, subjects were asked to guess how many questions they had gotten correct before we showed them their mark. This is how many answers they had actually gotten correct, not how marks they thought the computer will give them (which they know will be lower). For example, imagine a subject thinks they got six answers correct, and got five marks. We ask them for the number of answers they got correct, so they will say six. We used these to screen for overconfidence. If a subjects guessed that they had gotten a higher number of questions correct than they actually had, we inferred that they were overconfident; if not, we inferred that they were underconfident. 7 If After the subject has taken all five tests, we randomly select one bid and use it to play a BDM game (Becker et al. (1964) ). This is an auction game, where a subject first bids for the item (the extra test). Then we generate a random number between zero and the maximum monetary value of the test -this is its price. If the bid is greater than or equal to the price, the subject purchases the test for that price. They then take the test. A subject's optimal strategy is to bid the exact monetary value of the test to them. As the monetary value of each correct answer is common knowledge, we can infer how many questions they think they would get correct from the amount they bid. If they won, subjects then took the test and then the experiment ended. If they lost, the experiment ended.
We directly observe the output that subjects observe -we know what mark each subject gets each round. As above, in the BDM game subjects' best strategy is to bid the exact monetary value of the test to them -φf (a, e) when φ = 1. Hence we can assume that their bid represents the value of f (a, e) t (their score) in the final test given their belief about the marker that round. We recover f (a, e) t , the number of answers they think they would get correct given their beliefs as that time, by dividing their bid at t by the value of each correct answer in the final test. Therefore, we can recover their belief about the fundamental using (9) -dividing the marks they got by the marks they think whether individuals are overconfident (e.g Burks et al. (2013) ). Some might also worry that ordering effects (e.g see Peiran & Nax (2018) ) will bias subjects' answers. But the distribution of subjects' answers and confidence provides strong evidence against ordering effects -see the Appendix. they would get if they took a test where all correct answers were marked as correct.
A potential confound is that subjects might not bid their maximum willingness to pay for the test given all the information they have about the marker at that time. If they do not, we cannot infer how many questions they think they would get correct without the marker from their bid. This is why we use a BDM game instead of directly asking subjects their belief about φ. Experimental tests have shown that, if it is stated carefully, subjects bid their maximum willingness to pay in BDM games not just in theory but in practice (see Lusk & Rousou (2006) , and Lusk & Shogren (2007) ). Hence each bid will be an accurate measure of subjects' willingness to pay for the extra test after each round, given the information they obtain from that round. To further incentivise subjects to update on the information they have and bid accurately, we raised the piece rate for the final test to $0.20 per question.
Also, subjects may not have understood the BDM game correctly. Then, their bids would not have accurately reflected their beliefs about the computerised marker. Hence, we took steps to ensure subjects understood the game. We based our instructions on the instructions in Berry et al. (2018) , who field tested and adjusted them to ensure subjects would understand the game correctly. We also used examples, gave a link to a page explaining why it was in subjects' best interest to bid their maximum willingness to pay for the test, and did not allow subjects to progress until they had correctly answered questions showing that they have understood the game. These features have been shown to help subjects understand how to bid (see Lusk & Shogren (2007) ).
Three potential issues could also arise with the questions: subjects could not have gotten any questions correct, subjects could have looked up the answers online, or the test score could be independent of effort. The first is an issue because if subjects did not get any questions correct, they could not have made an inference about φ. Their mark would have been zero whatever φ is. The second is an issue because if subjects could look up answers, then they could observe their own output independent of φ. The third is an issue because subjects could either know the answers to questions or not. If they either know the answers or not, they cannot adjust their effort in response to their beliefs about φ. Thus, the theory would not apply. The second was a particular worry because we are conducting the experiment online so subjects could search for answers, and if subjects did find them then they could share them with other subjects using the MTurk forum. Experimenters often use questions from management school entrance exams (Kruger 1999) or general knowledge questions with unintuitive answers (e.g see Ludwig & Nafziger (2011) ), but questions from management school entrance exams are too difficult for a lot of participants, and general knowledge questions that have unintuitive answers can easily be looked up online.
Therefore we took the questions from the practice book for the CEM 11+ verbal reasoning examination: a verbal reasoning test taken by some primary school students in the UK. These questions are designed for primary school children, so are relatively easy. Furthermore we trialled the questions that we used: we gave a group of MTurkers (n=38) one of each of the type questions from the paper, examined the mean score for each type of question. We then selected the questions that the highest proportion of subjects got right, and used these questions in our main experiment. Subjects could not look up the answers to the questions as they are not available online -they are only published in the practice book. Though they are relatively easy, they are not factual questions -they are questions that require subjects to think to obtain an answer. Thus, subjects can put in different levels of effort, and we expect test scores to vary with effort. Experimental evidence subjects do vary effort on these types of cognitive test, and that scores do vary with effort (e.g see Segal (2012) , Borghans et al. (2008) ).
In addition to trialling the questions, we trialled different versions of the design to see whether parts of the description were unclear. We iteratively trialled and improved our design, both on undergraduate students and MTurkers, paying special attention to the BDM instructions. We excluded all individuals who took part in any trial from the main experiment.
We implemented the experiment as an online survey using Qualtrics, and recruited subjects on Amazon MTurk. 226 subjects participated in the experiment. After excluding those who failed our attention check, we have 189 observations. 8 The experiment took an average of 37 minutes including instructions. On average, subjects earned $0.81, with standard deviation of $0.61.
Results
Our first result supports the first prediction.
Result 1 Overconfident subjects have lower beliefs about the value of the fundamental than underconfident subjects
Figures 3 shows the distribution of overconfident and underconfident subjects' beliefs about φ ('Phi' ) each round. Table 1 gives some descriptive statistics. Figure 4 shows the mean of overconfident subjects' beliefs about φ each round. To identify differences between overconfident and underconfident subjects beliefs, we regress subjects perceptions of the computer after round one and after round five on a dummy variable, OV ERCON F IDEN T . For some subject i, OV ERCON F IDEN T i = 1 if and only if i is overconfident, and is 0 otherwise. We then include gender, age, and ethnicity controls.
After round 1:
After round 5: subjects, we remove those whose bids generate implausible values of φ -those that are undefined or greater than 1.5 The results of both regressions are given in Table 2 . There is a statistically significant difference between overconfident and underconfident subjects beliefs about φ after the final round. As the model predicts, overconfident subjects on average believe that the computer marked a lower proportion of their answers correctly than underconfident subjects. But we also find a statistically significant difference between overconfident and underconfident subjects' beliefs about the fundamental after the first round. Figure 4 shows this difference. The effect remains significant when we control for gender (dummy variable 1 if male, 0 otherwise), age, and ethnicity (dummy variable 1 if white, 0 otherwise), but gets smaller. All of the control variables are significant except age in the first round, and gender in both.
We do not try to identify a causal relationship -there might ommitted variable bias from factors we did not observe, such as IQ (e.g see Burks et al. 2013 ).
The second result is consistent with Heidhues et al.'s theory. If the theory is correct, overconfident subjects' beliefs about φ should fall over the rounds. By contrast, underconfident subjects' beliefs about φ should converge towards 0.5 over the rounds. Thus, we should find a significant difference between overconfident and underconfident subjects' beliefs in the final round. But, the first result is not. We might still see difference after the first round if overconfident subjects update their belief by a large amount. We would expect to see a larger difference after the fifth round than the first -a more negative coefficient. Both sets of subjects have updated their beliefs more times, so overconfident subjects's beliefs should have fallen more while underconfident subjects' should have converged more towards 0.5. We find, however, that coefficient in the first regression is more negative in the first round than the fifth. We then test the causal effect of updating on subjects' beliefs. We use a panel regression model, as our data has both cross-sectional and time components -the subject, and their belief about φ after each round. As the model makes different predictions for overconfident and underconfident subjects, we estimate a different model for each.
To identify the causal effects of updating on overconfident subjects' beliefs about φ, we use a fixed effects panel model. Each observation is subject's result in one round of the experiment. 9
for t = 1, ..., 5, i = 1, ..., 149 ROU N D i,t is the round number, equivalent to the number of times the subject has updated their beliefs. Including individual fixed effects controls for all time-invariant individual differences. The only thing that changes over the rounds in the experiment is the number of times the subject updates their belief. Therefore, including individual fixed-effects allows us to identify the causal effect of updating on overconfident individuals' beliefs about φ -the coefficient β is the effect of just changing the number of times they have updated on subjects' beliefs about φ, holding all else fixed through the individual fixed effects.
To work out the causal effect of updating for underconfident subjects, we need to use a different dependent variable. The model predicts that underconfident subjects' beliefs will converge to some distance ∆ from Φ. But they may approach this point from below, above, or fluctuate around the true value. Therefore, we want to identify the effect of updating on the distance of underconfident subjects' beliefs about φ from Φ. The model predicts that underconfident subjects' beliefs will converge to a point nearer Φ, so there should be a negative causal effect of updating on the distance of their beliefs from Φ. 10 Therefore, we regress the number of update rounds on the squared distance of the subject's belief about φ from Φ (0.5):
for t = 1, ..., 5, i = 1, ..., 40.
As above, ROU N D i,t is the round number, equivalent to the number of times the subject has updated their beliefs. As before, including individual fixed effects allows us to identify the causal effect of updating, as the number of times subjects update is the only factor that varies over time in our experiment. β is the causal effect of updating beliefs on y. We square the distance so that deviations above and below 0.5 are treated equally. The results of both regressions are given in Table 3 . Notes: The dependent variable for overconfident subjects is the proportion of correct answers that the subject believes are marked as incorrect. The dependent variable for underconfident subjects is the squared distance of belief from 0.5. Standard errors are given in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level ** Significant at the 5% level * Significant at the 10% level If Heidhues et al.'s model is correct, we would expect to see a statistically significant and negative coefficient in both cases. Updating causes overconfident subjects' beliefs to decrease (prediction 2), and the spread of underconfident subjects' beliefs to decrease (prediction 3). We do find negative coefficients, but neither are significant. Thus these results suggest that the theory does not correctly predict how overconfident or underconfident subjects learn about the fundamental. 11 We might also understand the model as only describing individuals who do not update their belief about their own ability. 12 If so, predictions 2 and 3 would only hold for subjects who do not update their beliefs about their own ability. Therefore, we take the subset of our sample who do not appear to update their belief about their own ability over the experiment and then re-run the analysis with on just their results. 13 We find 90 overconfident and 26 underconfident subjects who do not update their beliefs about their own ability. Thus, we omit the underconfident subjects as we have too few for any results to be reliable. If this interpretation of the theory is correct, we should now find a significant effect. We still find no significant effect.
The expected change might also be non-linear. In this case, and the non-linearity is extreme, we might not detect any effect even if it is present. Thus, we also re-run the analysis above with a non-linear model. We still find no significant effect in either case.
Result 4
There is no evidence that a proportion of overconfident subjects that update like Heidhues et al. predict Yet, we might have heterogeneous treatment effects. Updating may cause a proportion of overconfident subjects' beliefs to fall, but the proportion might just be small enough that we do not detect any significant effect in the regression. To see if there is any evidence for this, we then construct a non-parametric Gaussian mixture model, and apply it to the overconfident subjects' results from the first and fifth round. 14 A Gaussian mixture model is an algorithm that divides a set of data into a number of clusters. The modeller takes a set of data, and specifies a number of clusters to divide the data into. The algorithm then finds the clusters that best describes the information in the data, using an expectationmaximisation algorithm. 15 To do this, you need to know the numbers of clusters to divide the data into, which we did not. Hence our algorithm takes a range of possible number of clusters (one to fifteen), clusters the data, and gives each assignment a score based on how well it describes the data. The algorithm then selects the model with the best score. 16 We have a set of points representing each subjects' scores and beliefs about φ in the first and fifth rounds. If updating does cause an overconfident subject's beliefs to fall over updating rounds, the point representing their score should move downwards in the φ dimension between the rounds. Thus, if updating causes all overconfident subjects' beliefs about φ to fall, the pairs of results in the first and final round should appear to be drawn from two different distributions one for subjects in Figure 5 : Example Gaussian Mixture Model Output Example of output we would observe if all subjects could be described using Heidhues et al. (2018) 's theory. Generated using synthetic data with n = 100. Means and marks for each distribution are generated to make them two distributions as clear and distinct as possible.
the first round with a higher belief about φ, and another for subjects from the final round with a lower belief about φ (e.g see Figure 5 ). Now consider the case of heterogeneous treatment effects. If updating does cause some subjects' beliefs about φ to fall, but not the others, the algorithm should identify those subjects points as being drawn from two distributions, one higher in φ space and the other lower in φ space, in amongst noise. Using the Gaussian mixture model is a better way of identifying heterogeneous causal effects than simply looking at the distribution of treatment effects.
Using the algorithm, we detect effects by finding the data generating process that best accounts for the information in the sample. But, if all of the individual treatment effects were drawn randomly, some may be large enough to appear significant by chance, not due to the underlying data generating process. Thus, if we just look at the individual effects, it may appear as if a proportion of our subjects followed Heidhues et al.'s model, even if they did not. Yet, as shown in Figure 6 , the model that best fits our data does not look like this -individuals appear to be drawn from distributions centered on output, not beliefs about φ. 17 Thus, there is no evidence that any proportion of individuals follow Heidhues et al.'s theory. 
Discussion
In this paper, we experimentally test the theory in Heidhues et al. (2018) that confidence affects how individuals learn about fundamentals when they cannot separately identify the effects of their ability and the fundamentals on their output. This describes a large proportion of individuals in many economically important situations, such as managers delegating to employees, politicians allocating resources to projects, and CEOs making investment decisions. If their theory is correct, overconfident individuals act sub-optimally in all of these situations because of how they learn about the fundamentals. As these decisions affect many individuals and a huge percentage of world output, this would imply large welfare losses. If a social planner could intervene to correct how they learn for less than the costs the decisions impose, perhaps by review processes that force individuals to update their beliefs about their own ability or allow them to separately identify its effect on output, the theory implies that this would be welfare-improving.
Overconfident individuals do appear to have lower beliefs about the fundamental after multiple updating rounds, as the model predicts. But they also have lower beliefs about the fundamental after a single round. Overconfident subjects initially have lower beliefs about the fundamental, so the difference in the final could be because neither group's beliefs about the computerised marker change over time. Our evidence suggests that the theory is not a good description of how how individuals learn. Though we find that updating causes overconfident subjects' beliefs about the fundamental to fall, and underconfident subjects' to converge nearer the true value, neither effect is significant. We also do not find any clustering patterns consistent with a group of overconfident individuals learning as the model predicts. This suggests that the coefficients are negative due to chance, not a causal effect.
One explanation of our results is that subjects simply did not update their beliefs throughout our experiment. This is implausible for two reasons: the subjects receive new information each round, and the BDM mechanism directly incentivises them to use this information to update their beliefs about the marker each round. If they did not update their beliefs, subjects would not bid the optimal amount for the test, as the additional information from that round may change their willingness to pay for the test. This explanation also cannot account for the significant difference between overconfident and underconfident subjects' beliefs about the marker after the first round. If the only reason for our results is that subjects do not update over the experiment, we would not expect to see a difference between the mean beliefs of overconfident and underconfident subjects in either round. Their prior probabilities can be modelled as if they are drawn from the same distribution, so their means should be the same (see Heidhues et al. (2018) ).
Another obvious explanation of our results is that individuals update their beliefs about their own ability. If overconfident individuals do update their beliefs about their own ability, the learning process given in the model may not occur. Note, however, that if they do not update their belief about their own ability enough in response to evidence, they will still make incorrect inferences about the fundamental and thus they will still end up with inaccurate beliefs. The student will still think the professor is harsher than they are, though not as harsh as they would have done. Experimental evidence that overconfident individuals do seek information about their own ability when updating their beliefs supports this explanation (e.g see Burks et al. (2013) ). If this was the only explanation, we would expect to see a significant effect in the sub-sample who do not update their beliefs about their own ability. We do not. It also does not explain the difference in the mean beliefs between overconfident and underconfident subjects we observe at the beginning of the experiment. Finally, the model could be misspecified. Just being overconfident, or another factor that covaries with overconfidence, could directly cause individuals to have unrealistically low perceptions of the fundamental. If so, overconfident individuals would always have lower perceptions of the fundamental. This would explain why there is no evidence of change of beliefs about the marker over the experiment; why in our panel regressions we find fixed effects that varied across individuals and had a significant impact upon beliefs about the marker; and why there is already a significant difference between overconfident and underconfident subjects after the first round of updating. This explanation is also consistent with experiments that have shown that sub-optimal decisions made by overconfident individuals are sensitive to factors other than confidence (e.g Malmendier & Tate (2005) ).
Others could extend our research by directly testing these explanations. We only identify subjects' beliefs about the fundamental. Others could collect more detailed data on personal attributes following Malmendier & Tate (2005) , and test whether any predict lower beliefs about the value of the fundamental in these situations The model and our results both suggest that overconfident individuals will take sub-optimal actions in situations where they cannot separately identify the effect of the fundamental and ability on output, as they have unrealistically low beliefs about φ. Others could test whether this occurs, and measure the magnitude of welfare losses from these decisions.
Appendix

Robustness Checks -Order Effects
Ordering effects (e.g see Peiran & Nax (2018) ) might confound our measure of subjects' overconfidence, as subjects answers may depend on our framing in the instructions. To assess whether subjects are overconfident or underconfident, we ask to guess the number of questions they actually got correct in the first round before we tell them their mark, and compare that to the number of questions they did actually get correct. In our instructions, we say that the marker will mark some correct answers as incorrect. This is not directly relevant to subjects' answers, as we clearly ask them about the questions they actually got correct, not the mark that the marker gives them. This might cause an order effect, however -our negative framing of the marker in the instructions may spill over into subjects perceptions of their own ability. If so, subjects estimates of their score will be lower than they should be. Thus, we would infer that more subjects are underconfident than we should. As we are seeking to identify different effects in both groups, this would distort our results. Figure 7 shows the distribution of subjects beliefs about the number of questions they got correct. If there are these order effect in our experiment, our framing of the instructions will shift individuals' beliefs about their own ability downwards from what they should have been. Thus, we would not expect to see many individuals with very high beliefs about their own ability. But, many subjects do have high beliefs about their own ability -23 out of 189 think they got all of the questions correct, and 79 think they only got one question wrong. This is strong evidence we do not have order effects.
Robustness Checks -Learning Effects
As we use a within-subject design, we carry out some further analysis to see if there is evidence that subjects learn how to answer our tests over the course of the experiment (learning effects). Learning effects are a common problem for within-sample designs, and would cast doubt on our results. We construct the following fixed effect regression model for overconfident and underconfident subjects: 18
If subjects learn the answers to questions over the course of the experiment, we would expect to see a significant positive coefficient on scores in each regression.
The results of the regressions are presented in Table 3 . The mean scores of overconfident and underconfident subjects each round are shown in Figures 9 and 10. Neither regression coefficient is positive and significant. Thus, there is no evidence of learning effects.
Robustness Checks -Gaussian Mixture Model
The Gaussian mixture model might have clustered subjects as it has in Figure 6 because subjects can get a greater range of marks than beliefs about φ. Hence the Euclidean distance between subjects who have the same mark but different beliefs about φ will tend to be higher than between subjects who have the same beliefs about φ but different marks. So the algorithm might be more likely to cluster subjects by mark than by φ.
To ensure that this is not why our algorithm is clustering subjects as in Figure 6 , we multiplied each subject's φ value by 10. This means the Euclidean distance between subjects with different beliefs about φ but the same mark will tend to be higher than between subjects with different marks but the same belief about φ. If the algorithm is just clustering subjects in Figure 6 because of the different ranges of mark and φ, the clusters will disappear.
We then ran the same algorithm to cluster this new data. The results are below: Figure 11 : Clusters in Data from Overconfident Subjects in Rounds 1 and 5 -Transformed Data Generated with the data from overconfident subjects in round 1 and 5, where all 'Phi' values are multiplied by 10
The clusters from Figure 6 do not disappear. Hence there is no evidence that we find these clusters because marks and beliefs about φ are defined over different ranges.
The results could also just be because of the information criterion we use to select models -the Bayesian information criterion. To check for this, we re-ran the algorithm and used the alternative Akaike information criterion instead. The algorithm assigns all points to exactly the same clusters.
Survey Instructions and Design
In this section, we go though our survey and show what subjects saw at each stage. This subsection includes the instructions subjects read. The next section presents the questions we asked subjects by round.
Instructions:
If a subject failed the attention check, they were shown the following message and we ended the survey.
7. Find the letter that will complete all of the following words:
Example: The letter that completes car , asy, fir , ver would be e. min , ar, se , ast 8. Write two words, one from each set of brackets, that complete the sentence in the most sensible way.
Example: The answer for Roof is to (gutter, chimney, tiles) as wall is to (paint, strong, bricks) would be tiles, bricks.
Dull is to (dim slow dirty) as light is to (bright beacon coloured) Round 3 1. Select the word outside the brackets that has a similar meaning to the words in both sets of brackets
Example: the answer to '(topic theme) (citizen resident) issue inhabitant subject person point' would be 'subject'.
(dry clear) (nice lovely) bright good great fine 2. Find the number that continues each sequence below in the best way.
Example: if the sequence was 13, 18, 23, 28 the answer would be 33. 4, 10, 16, 22, 28, 3. Find the letter that will complete all of the following words:
Example: The letter that completes car , asy, fir , ver would be e bra , est, war , ose 4. Write two words, one from each set of brackets, that complete the sentence in the most sensible way.
Smell is to (sense, sneeze, nose) as hear is to (listen, ear, noise).
5.
Select the word outside the brackets that has a similar meaning to the words in both sets of brackets.
(near adjacent) (shut secure) lock adjoining close seal neighbouring 6. Find the number that continues each sequence below in the best way.
